国有企业混合所有制改革与股价崩盘风险——基于信息不对称视角

State-Owned Enterprise Mixed Reform and Stock Price Crash Risk——Based on the Perspective of Information Asymmetry

以2008—2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,基于国有企业混合所有制改革的背景,探索混合所有制改革对国有上市公司股价崩盘风险的影响与作用机制。研究结果表明,通过引入非国有资本,混合所有制改革能够有效降低国有企业的股价崩盘风险,经过一系列稳健性检验后,结论依然成立;国有企业混合所有制改革通过降低信息不对称程度对企业股价崩盘风险产生抑制效应;这种效应在市场化水平较低、不可被卖空的上市公司中更为显著,说明混合所有制改革的信息治理作用与外部制度环境之间呈现一定的替代效应。

Taking a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2018 as research samples,and based on the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper explores the impact and mechanism of mixed ownership reform on stock price crash risk of state-owned listed companies.It is found that by introducing non-state-owned capital,mixed ownership reform can effectively reduce the risk of stock price collapse of state-owned enterprises.After a series of robustness tests,the results remain unchanged.The mixed reform of state-owned enterprises can restrain the risk of stock price collapse by reducing the degree of information asymmetry.This effect is more significant in the listed companies with low marketization level and cannot be short-sold,which indicates that there is a certain substitution effect between the information governance function of mixed reform and the external institutional environment.