产业政策、分析师关注与企业盈余管理

Industrial Policy,Analyst Coverage and Corporate Earnings Management

高质量的会计信息是宏观经济发展与微观企业决策的重要来源和依据。以具有中国特色的国家产业政策为切入点,采用2006—2019年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了产业政策对企业盈余管理的影响机理以及分析师关注的调节效应。研究发现:产业政策可以降低企业融资约束、提升企业投资效率、提高企业市场预期以及引致新闻媒体关注,进而对企业盈余管理具有抑制作用;相比于应计盈余管理,产业政策对真实盈余管理的抑制作用更强。调节作用检验发现:分析师关注可以加快产业政策信息的有效和准确传递,降低企业管理层盈余管理动机,因而强化了产业政策对企业盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结论为揭示产业政策对企业会计信息质量的激励作用以及证券分析师的信息“放大器”功能提供了新的经验证据,对优化产业政策制定与执行、引导分析师信息传递和价值发现具有一定借鉴意义。

High quality accounting information is an important source and basis for macro-economic development and micro enterprise decision-making.Taking the national industrial policy with Chinese characteristics as the starting point and using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2019 as the research samples,this paper empirically tests the influence mechanism of industrial policy on corporate earnings management and the moderating effect of analyst coverage.The results show that industrial policy can reduce corporate financing constraints,improve corporate investment efficiency,increase corporate market expectations and attract the news media’s coverage,which can inhibit corporate earnings management.Meanwhile,compared with accrual earnings management,industrial policy has a stronger inhibitory effect on real earnings management.The moderating effect test finds that analyst coverage can speed up the effective and accurate transmission of industrial policy information,reduce the motivation of earnings management,and thus strengthen the inhibitory effect of industrial policy on corporate earnings management.The conclusion provides new empirical evidence for revealing the incentive effect of industrial policy on corporate accounting information quality and the information amplifier function of securities analysts.At the same time,it can be used for reference to optimize the formulation and implementation of industrial policies,guide analysts’information transmission and value discovery.