不同政府补贴策略下跨境出口电商供应链的决策研究

Research on the Decision-making of Cross-border E-commerce Supply Chain under Different Government Subsidy Strategies

国家通过频繁出台产业扶持政策,将跨境电商努力培育成外贸新业态。考虑政府利好政策对于跨境出口电商供应链的激励效果以及供应链收益提升的自身需求,政府补贴因素以及服务水平因素,构建了包括出口制造企业与跨境电商企业的供应链博弈模型,分别探讨了在无政府补贴策略、交易量补贴策略以及服务水平补贴策略下跨境出口电商供应链的价格、交易量、服务水平以及利润情况的最优化决策,并通过算例进行了论证。研究表明,当政府补贴比例处于较低水平时,实施交易量补贴策略比服务水平补贴策略更有助于提高供应链的交易量、服务水平以及各主体利润,而当政府补贴比例达到较高水平时,情况则相反。

Our government has made efforts to cultivate cross-border e-commerce into a new form of foreign trade through frequent industrial support policies. Considering the incentive effect of the favorable government policies on the cross-border export e-commerce supply chain and the self-demand for the improvement of the supply chain revenue, as well as considering the factors of government subsidies and service level, this paper constructs a supply chain game model including export manufacturing enterprises and cross-border e-commerce enterprises, and discusses the optimal decision of price, transaction volume, service level and profit of the crossborder export e-commerce supply chain, which are demonstrated by arithmetic examples. The research shows that when the proportion of government subsidies is at a low level, the implementation of transaction volume subsidy strategy is more helpful than service level subsidy strategy to improve the transaction volume, service level and profits of each entity in the supply chain. while the opposite is true when the government subsidy ratio is at a high level.