组织结构、稽查策略与企业逃税

Organizational Structure,Audit Strategy and Corporate Tax Evasion

尽管税收稽查被认为是治理逃税的重要手段,但在面临预算约束的情况下,如何优化稽查策略是理论和政策层面更为关注的话题。基于稽查体制改革试点政策,本文从组织结构的维度探讨了稽查策略的优化及其对企业逃税的影响。研究发现,以稽查层级扁平化和权限上移为特点的组织结构调整强化了对大型企业的稽查力度,减少了企业逃税,相比于非试点地区,试点地区大型企业的所得税实际税负平均提高约11%。在具体机制上,则主要体现为关联交易和不合理税收优惠申报的减少,这契合了组织结构调整强化跨区域交易监管的逻辑。进一步地,研究发现基本结论在所有制、企业规模等维度存在显著的异质性。同时,匹配微观层面的结果,研究显示改革显著提升了宏观层面整体的查补税额。本文的研究对我国税收征管体制的改革提供了有益启示。

Although tax audit is considered as an important way to deal with tax evasion,how to optimize the audit strategy under the budget constraints is more of a concern at the theoretical and policy levels.Based on an experiment of tax audit system reform in China,this paper studies the impact of the optimization of audit strategy on corporate tax evasion from the perspective of organizational structure.We find that the adjustment of organizational structure which flattens the hierarchy of tax audit system and transfers the power to the provincial level has strengthened the audit intensity of large enterprises and reduced corporate tax evasion.Compared with non-pilot areas,the effective tax rate of large enterprises in pilot areas has increased by about 11%on average.In terms of specific mechanism,it is mainly reflected in the reduction of connected transactions and unreasonable tax preference,which shows that the adjustment of organizational structure has really strengthened the supervision of interregional transactions.Further,the conclusions are significantly heterogeneous in the dimensions of ownership and size of enterprises.Finally,the reform significantly increases the amount of additional tax on the provincial level,which matches with the results at the corporate level.This research provides some useful inspirations for the reform of tax collection system in China.