基金经理与卖方分析师存在合谋吗

Is There Collusion between Fund Managers and Sell-Side Analysts?

现有研究大多认为卖方分析师为自身利益“迎合”基金,本文却发现了卖方分析师与基金“合谋”炒作的证据,具体表现为:绩差基金在短期业绩考核压力下,会加大增持低关注度股票(信息不对称程度高)进行冒险投机,为获得卖方分析师的支持,绩差基金会竭尽所能帮助分析师个人评选为明星分析师,并在分仓佣金上给分析师所在证券公司予以回报。本文研究发现,为绩差基金提供乐观分析报告并密切追踪的分析师被评选为明星分析师的概率超过了为绩优基金提供乐观分析报告的分析师。另外,绩差基金所持股票在卖方分析师推荐下呈现短期上涨又下跌的“短命”走势,体现出明显的“合谋”特征,而绩优基金所持股票则呈现稳定的走势。本文的发现丰富了基金和分析师关系理论,同时为完善基金公司长效考核与卖方分析师独立声誉评价机制提供了证据支持。

Most of the studies done so far believe that sell-side analysts cater to funds for their own benefits.But this paper finds evidence of“collusion”between sell-side analysts and funds.Specifically,under the short-term performance assessment pressure,funds with poor performance tend to increase the ratio of low-attention stocks(with a high degree of information asymmetry)to raise the fund performance in the short term.In order to gain the support of sell-side analysts,these funds will do everything they can to help the analysts to become star analysts and pay more commission to the securities companies where these analysts belong to.This paper finds that analysts who provide optimistic reports and follow closely for low-performance funds are more likely to be selected as star analysts than those who provide reports for high-performance funds.In addition,the stocks held by under-performing funds show a short-lived trend of pulling up and down after they are recommended by sell-side analysts,showing obvious“collusion”characteristics,while stocks held by high-performance funds show a stable trend.The findings enrich the theory of the relationship between funds and analysts.At the same time,this paper provides evidence in favor of improving the long-term evaluation of fund companies and independent reputation evaluation mechanisms for sell-side analysts.