摘要
文章基于社会治理共同体视角,针对煤矿安全监管过程中存在的问题,构造了煤矿安全监管三方博弈模型,并通过复制动态方程和系统动力学方法,对比分析了有无社会主体参与监管对煤矿安全水平的不同影响。研究发现:(1)煤矿安全监管中如仅有煤监局地方分局和煤矿集团两者进行博弈,难以摆脱此起彼伏的博弈困局;(2)社会主体加入到煤矿安全监管博弈中能够快速有效地改变博弈格局,促进煤矿集团提高安全投入率,弥补煤监局地方分局监管的不足,实现煤矿安全水平的有效提升。研究结果表明,社会主体参与煤矿安全监管极其重要,理应受到重视。
Based on the perspective of social governance community,aiming at the problems existing in the process of coal mine safety supervision,this paper constructs a tripartite game model of coal mine safety supervision,and by copying dynamic equations and system dynamics methods,it compares and analyzes the different effects on the level of coal mine safetywith and without the participation of social entities in supervision.The research finds that:(1)in the coal mine safety supervision,if there are only the local branch of the coal mine supervision bureau and the coal mine group playingthe game,it is difficult to get rid of the game dilemmaone after another;(2)The participation of social subjects in the game of coal mine safety supervision can quickly and effectively change the game pattern,promote the coal mine group to improve the safety investment rate,make up for the lack of supervision by the local branches of the Coal Mine Supervision Bureau,and realize the effective improvement of the coal mine safety level.The research results show that it is extremely important for social subjects to participate in coal mine safety supervision,which should be paid attention to.
作者
王健
何叶荣
王向前
WANG Jian;HE Yerong;WANG Xiangqian(School of Economics and Management,Anhui University of Science and Technology,Huainan,Anhui 232001,China;School of Economics and Management,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei,Anhui 230601,China)
出处
《安徽理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第3期18-25,共8页
Journal of Anhui University of Science and Technology:Social Science
基金
国家基金面上项目(51874003,51704012)
教育部自然科学基金青年项目(18YJC630040)
安徽省自然科学基金面上项目(2108085MG241)
安徽理工大学2021年研究生创新基金项目(2021CX2134)。
关键词
社会治理
煤矿安全
监管
演化博弈
系统动力学
social governance
coal mine safety
supervision
evolutionary game
system dynamic