员工持股计划中高管认购比例是否影响企业投资偏好

Whether the Proportion of Executive Subscriptions in ESOPs Affect Corporate Investment Preferences

本文以2014-2019年沪深A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,考察员工持股计划中高管认购比例对企业投资偏好的影响。分析结果表明,当期高管在员工持股计划中认购比例的增加,将引起企业下一期短期投资强度的增加以及长期投资强度的减少;中介机制检验表明,代理成本起到了部分中介效应,高管在员工持股计划中的认购程度将加重企业代理成本进而导致企业短视化投资偏好;进一步研究发现,完善的内、外部监督治理机制以及安排较长的持股锁定期限能够抑制高管在员工持股计划中认购程度导致的投资决策短视偏好。

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019,this paper examines the impact of the shareholding proportion of senior managers in ESOPs on investment preferences.The results show that the increase of the proportion of executives subscribing in ESOPs will lead to the increase of short-term investment intensity and the decrease of long-term investment intensity in the next period.Agency costs play a part of the intermediary effect,thus the increase of the executives’subscriptions proportion in ESOPs will aggravate the agency cost and lead to the short-sighted investment preference of enterprises.Further research shows that a sound internal and external supervision and governance mechanism and a long lock-up period can restrain the short-sighted investment preference caused by the subscription degree of ex ecutives in ESOPs.