董事高管责任保险与违约风险——基于中国上市公司A股数据的经验研究

Directors′ and Officers′ Liability Insurance and Default Risk——An Empirical Study based on A-share Data of Chinese Listed Companies

作为一个市场化的治理机制,董事高管责任保险可能因其“监督激励效应”或“兜底效应”对公司的违约风险产生影响。基于沪深A股2003~2020年上市公司数据,本文实证检验了这一影响。结果表明,董事高管责任保险能够显著降低上市公司的违约风险;在一系列的稳健性检验和内生性处理之后,上述结论仍然成立。机制分析发现,董事高管责任保险通过提升上市公司的内部控制质量和公司价值降低了违约风险。进一步研究表明,董事高管责任保险对市场化程度低地区的上市公司和国有控股上市公司违约风险的抑制作用更为显著。本研究充实了对董事高管责任保险治理职能的认识,丰富了抑制公司违约风险的治理机制。

Directors′ and officers′ liability insurance(D&O insurance) is a new market-oriented governance mechanism.It impacts on corporate default risks possibly due to its "supervisory and incentivizing effect" and "protection effect".Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2020,the paper empirically tested the impact of D&O insurance on corporate default risk.The results show that D&O insurance can significantly reduce the default risk of listed companies.After various robustness tests and endogenous treatment, the above conclusion is still valid.Mechanism analysis finds that D&O insurance reduces the risk of default by improving the internal control quality and corporate value of listed companies.Further research shows that D&O insurance has a more significant inhibitory effect on the default risk of listed companies in regions with low degree of marketization and state-owned listed companies.This study not only enriches the understanding of the governance function of D&O insurance, but also enriches the governance mechanism to curb the risk of corporate default.