基于三方演化博弈的城市生活垃圾分类主体行为研究

A Study of the Main Body Behavior of Municipal Solid Waste Classification Based on Tripartite Game

考虑到城市生活垃圾分类治理链中各利益主体之间的相互影响,本文构建了地方政府、垃圾处理企业和居民的三方演化博弈模型,分析了在三种不同情形下的系统演化稳定策略。仿真分析结果表明:城市生活垃圾分类三方演化博弈系统中存在三个系统均衡策略,且政府惩罚强度、监管成本均会对三方演化结果产生影响,但初始概率对系统稳定性的影响不大。因此,适当的行政处罚能在一定程度上提高垃圾处理企业实施绿色处理的概率,但长期来看负向处罚不宜过高。而合理的监管成本能有效激发地方政府的监管行为,但监管成本太高也会造成管理困境。

Considering the mutual influence of various stakeholders in the municipal solid waste classification and governance chain,in this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,waste disposal enterprises and residents,and analyzes the system evolution stability strategy under three different situations.The results of simulation analysis show that there are three system equilibrium strategies in the tripartite evolutionary game system,and the intensity of government punishment and regulatory cost will have an impact on the tripartite evolutionary results,however the initial probability has little effect on the system stability.Therefore,to a certain extent,appropriate penalties can improve the probability of of waste disposal enterprises to implement green disposal,but in the long run the negative penalties should not be too high.Reasonable regulatory costs can effectively stimulate the regulatory behavior of local governments,but high regulatory costs can also create management dilemmas.