机制设计视角下中国农地制度激励相容机制研究

Research on the Incentive Compatibility Mechanism of China's Agricultural Land System from the Perspective of Mechanism Design

中央政府在推动我国经济转型和农地制度变迁发挥着决定性作用。通过构建农地制度改革中央与地方政府之间的多任务委托-代理模型,中央政府对地方政府分析,最优合约形式最优激励合同设计的影响因素,并着重探讨了农地制度改革的实施成本对地方绩效评估系统权重系数的影响。研究表明,最优激励合同中农地制度的评价指数与农地制度改革的实施成本存在正相关关系,中央政府的主观行为及其与地方政府关系在很大程度上塑造了农地制度变迁路径。因此,农地转让权制度实现实质性突破需要中央政府的主观意向真正由“效率优先,兼顾公平”转变为“以公平促效率”,并构建中央和地方双赢的激励相容机制,包括与改革目标耦合的地方政府绩效考核体系和明确有效的土地监督制度,更好地推进政策落地。

The central government plays a decisive role in promoting China's economic transformation and agricultural land system changes.By constructing a multi-task principal-agent model between the central and local governments in the reform of the agricultural land system,this paper analyzes the relationship between the central government and the local governments and the factors influencing the optimal contract form and the optimal incentive contract design,then itexplores the impact of the implementationcost of the agricultural land system reform on theweight coefficients of local performance evaluation systems.The findings show that there is a positive correlation between the evaluation index of the farmland system in the optimal incentive contract and the implementation cost of the reform of the farmland system.The subjective behavior of the central government and its relationship with the local governments have largely shaped the changing path of the farmland system.Therefore,to achieve a substantial breakthrough in the farmland transfer right system,the central government's subjective intention needs to be truly transformed from“efficiency first,taking fairnessinto account”to“promoting efficiency with fairness”.Anincentive compatibility mechanism that both the central and local governments can win should be constructed,including a reformtarget-coupled local government performance appraisal system and a clear and effective land supervision system,so as to better promote the implementation of the policies.