退市制度改革抑制上市公司财务舞弊行为了吗?

Does Reform of Delisting System Restrain Listed Companies Financial Fraud?

上市公司退市制度是证券市场一项基础性制度,其能否有效地抑制企业财务舞弊行为值得关注,文章以2009—2015年沪深A股上市公司为样本,通过双重差分模型检验其对企业财务舞弊行为的治理作用。研究从财务舞弊的视角考察了退市制度治理效率及经济后果,发现退市制度对于盈利能力差及所处法制环境较差的上市公司治理效力不佳,对盈余管理行为具有制约和诱导双重作用。应进一步降低财务指标的制度性约束作用,压缩绩效差的上市公司操控利润的弹性空间,将财务定量指标与资本市场定性指标相结合,完善监管体系,发挥资本市场有效配置资源和优胜劣汰的作用。

The delisting system of listed companies is a basic system in the securities market.Whether it can effectively inhibit the financial fraud of enterprises is worthy of attention.This paper selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015 as samples,and uses the double difference method to test its governance effect on the financial fraud of enterprises.It examines the governance efficiency and economic consequences of the delisting system from the perspective of the financial fraud,and then it finds out that the delisting system has a poor governance effect on listed companies with poor profitability and legal environment.The reform of the delisting system has dual functions of restricting and inducing to the earnings management behavior,thus the institutional restraint of financial indicators should be further reduced,and the flexible space for poor performance listed companies to control their profits should be cut down.The financial quantitative indicators is to be combined with the capital market qualitative indicators,the regulatory system improved,and the role of capital market in effective allocation of resources and survival of the fittest given a full play.