美诺悖论:知识何以拥有理性的保障?

Meno’s Paradox:How Reason Warrant Knowledge?

美诺悖论这一经典的认识论问题暗示了认知无穷后退原则,即知识总是需要一个无穷序列的已知原因。在当代对此悖论的重新处理和回应中,主流观点聚焦于:人们是否可以在“认知空白”中进行探究?一个人是否有可能对所要寻求的东西全然不知,却仍然拥有使得他去探询的真信念?本文通过对知道状态、探究结果确认和信念获取的考察,揭示了“认知空白”隐藏的预设,并提醒人们,是否处于认知空白取决于高阶的认知,并且它本身随着信念的修正在不断变化,重要的是制造弥补空白的条件。美诺的发问由此可被理解为:如果探究的目标是某种知识,如何确定探究到的解释性内容是知识?对于美诺悖论这类关乎程度评估的标准问题,总是存在着两难——寻求定义还是枚举实例。本文在对这两个针锋相对的立场进行分析的基础上,出于实用考虑选择了一个最适合的、可共享的前提,那就是把知识的“真”看作一种主体间的认识论承诺。

The classic epistemological problem of Meno’s paradox relies on a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons.In the contemporary responses to this paradox,the prevailing view focuses on the question:is it possible for a person to inquire in the cognitive blank?Is it possible for her to know nothing but still have the true beliefs that lead him to inquire?This paper reveals the hidden presupposition of“cognitive blank”by examining the state of knowledge,the confirmation of inquiry results,and the acquisition of beliefs.It argues that whether or not to be in a cognitive gap depends on high-order cognition and changes with the correction of beliefs,and what is essential is creating conditions to make up for the blank.Therefore,we can understand Meno’s paradox as such:if the goal of inquiry is some knowledge,how can we be sure that the explanatory content inquired is knowledge?There is always a dilemma regarding criteria for assessing degrees,such as the Meno paradox,i.e.,to seek a definition or to enumerate examples.In this paper,we analyze these two opposing positions and,for practical reasons,choose the most appropriate and shareable premise:to consider the truth of knowledge as an intersubjective epistemological commitment.