征税能抑制企业涉房投资吗--兼论“脱实向虚”的另一条路径

Can Tax Curb Corporate Investment in Housing:On Another Path of“Entering Fictitious Economy from Real Economy”

近年来企业过度持有不动产的涉房投资倾向引发广泛关注,也背离了“脱虚向实”的政策导向。文章基于土地增值二次分配理论,利用2007-2019年我国沪、深两市上市公司微观数据考察了持有环节和转出环节税收对企业涉房投资行为的影响。实证结果显示:因为税基不能随房地产市场价值灵活升高,造成持有环节的房土两税表现出一定的累退性特征,从而无法有效抑制企业涉房投资;相比而言,转出环节的土地增值税能够显著抑制企业涉房投资倾向。进一步基于省级宏观面板数据的非对称反应模型估计结果显示,当前各地区土地增值税的征管力度受到地方政府的刻意操控,出现了相邻省份之间的标杆竞争现象,特别是省份间的竞低效应尤其突出,这对有效发挥土地增值税的作用产生了不利影响。文章的研究对未来进一步完善税制改革和引导企业投资“脱虚向实”具有一定的参考意义。

In recent years,the tendency of enterprises to over-hold real estates has aroused widespread concern,which also deviates from the policy orientation of investing on the real economy.This paper constructs a relatively independent real estate related investment system,which is regarded as a parallel concept with enterprise financialization.Enterprise financialization is the investment of financial assets by non-financial enterprises,while enterprise real estate related investment is the investment of real estate by non-real estate enterprises.They constitute the two paths of fictitious investment by real enterprises.Based on the secondary distribution theory of land appreciation,this paper uses the micro data of listed companies in stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2019 to investigate the impact of tax in different links on corporate investment in housing.The empirical results show that:because the tax base cannot flexibly increase with the market value of real estate,real estate tax and urban land use tax in the holding link show a certain regressive characteristic,which cannot effectively curb the corporate investment in housing.In contrast,the land value-added tax in the transferring out link can significantly restrain the tendency of corporate investment in housing.The inhibitory effect of land value-added tax on housing related investment will not hurt the normal production and operation needs,and there are heterogeneous characteristics of different periods,different types of ownership and different life cycles.Furthermore,the estimation results of the asymmetric response model based on provincial macro-panel data show that the current collection and management efforts of land value-added tax in various regions are deliberately manipulated by local governments,and there has been a phenomenon of benchmarking competition between neighboring provinces,especially the low effect between provinces,which has a negative impact on the effective use of the land value-added tax.This study has implications for improving the tax system reform and guiding the investment of enterprises to the real economy in the future.Enterprises'housing related investment is not only a part of fictitious investment by real enterprises,but also pin economic growth on housing prices,which has brought more adverse factors to stabilize the macro-economy in the future.Through the integrated reform of real estate tax and the improvement of the allocation of land value-added tax rights,we can give more reasonable play to the regulation effect of real estate investment of enterprises,which can not only promote real economy,but also promote economic growth and avoid the deep binding of macro-economy and housing prices.