控股股东高质押率下的公司股份回购--“伪市值管理工具”还是“价值信号”

Corporate Share Repurchases under High Pledge Ratio of the Controlling Shareholder--the"Fake Market Value Management Tool"or the"Value Signal"

在高股权质押率的背景下,控股股东会利用公司回购预案向市场发出信号以提振股价,缓解股价下行导致的控制权转移风险。然而,公司在回购期内可能并不实际执行股份回购,形成虚假式回购。本文以2012—2020年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨了控股股东股权质押率对公司回购决策的影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押率高的公司,发布虚假式回购预案的倾向更高;但该预案对股价崩盘风险并没有抑制效果,因为机构投资者可以识别出虚假式回购,并进行减持。这就意味着,虚假式回购信息的发布只会使中小投资者增持,进而遭遇股价崩盘的风险。进一步研究发现,“伪市值管理工具”能较好地用来解释控股股东高质押率公司发布虚假式回购预案的动机。本文不仅为中小投资者识别伪市值管理提供了实证证据,同时为规范上市公司股份回购行为,加强中小投资者保护提供了政策建议。

Under the background of high equity pledge rate,controlling shareholders will use the buyback plan to send signals to the market in an attempt to boost stock price,so as to alleviate the risk of control transitions caused by stock price decline.However,the company may not actually carry out share repurchase during the buyback period,forming a false buyback.Based on the sample of China's A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020,this paper explores the influence of equity pledge ratio of controlling shareholders on corporate buyback decisions.It is found that companies with high equity pledge ratio of controlling shareholders have a higher tendency to issue false repurchase plans.However,the plan has no effect on the risk of stock price collapse,and institutional investors will identify fake buybacks and reduce their holdings.Therefore,the issuance of fake buybacks will only lead to the increase of small investors and the risk of stock price collapse.Further research finds that the"pseudo-market value management tool"can better explain the motivation of companies with high pledge rate of controlling shareholders to issue false buyback plans.This paper not only provides empirical evidence for small and medium investors to identify pseudo-market value management,but also provides policy suggestions for standardizing the share repurchase behavior of listed companies and strengthening the protection of small and medium investors.