平衡论视角下个人免受自动化决策的法律保护

The Legal Protection for Individuals Not to be Subject to Automated Decisions from the Perspective of the Equilibrium Theory

随着自动化技术的发展和运用,人类的许多决策并不再由人自身作出,而是由机器完全自行作出或者由机器辅助作出。自动化决策正在改变传统的人是主体、机器是客体的人机关系模式,对人的尊严形成了挑战。自动化决策往往容易忽视正当程序理念,违反正当程序中的中立性原则、公开性原则和参与性原则。免受自动化决策的禁令进路和权利进路在规制目标、规制方式和规制限度等方面存在一定的分歧,但是,它们都在一定程度上忽视了数据主体与数据控制者之间的利益平衡。这种平衡论的引入可以改变我们对于个人免受自动化决策的权利效力、属性和规范的认识,并为个人免受自动化决策权利的实现提供方法论基础。

With the development and application of automation technologies, many human decisions are no longer made by human beings themselves, but by machines solely or assisted by machines instead. Automated decision-making is changing the traditional human-machine relationship model in which humans are the subject and machines are the object, posing a challenge to human dignity. Automated decision-making tends to ignore the concept of due process and violate the principles of neutrality, openness and participation in due process. The prohibition and the right protection approach, the two main kinds of protection approaches in practice, are different from each other in regulation objectives, regulation methods and regulation limits, but both of them ignore the balance of interests between data subjects and data controllers to a certain extent. The introduction of this equilibrium theory not only transforms our view of the validity, attributes and norms of individual’s right not to be subject to automated decisions, but also provides a methodological basis for the realization of this right.