共同机构所有权能抑制超额商誉吗——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

Can Common Institution Ownership Inhibit the Excess Goodwill?Evidences from China’s A-share Listed Companies

作为资本市场的新兴力量,共同机构投资者的治理作用备受关注。从共同机构所有权的视角,实证考察了共同机构所有权对上市公司超额商誉的影响。研究发现:共同机构所有权能有效抑制上市公司的超额商誉。进一步研究发现:共同机构所有权对超额商誉的抑制作用主要是通过规模效应机制与退出威胁机制实现的;共同机构所有权能降低企业并购后的商誉减值风险。因此,上市公司要积极引入共同机构投资者,完善公司治理,优化并购目标,抑制超额商誉。

As the emerging power in the capital market,the governing function of the common institution investors receives extensive attention.From the perspective of the common institution ownership,this paper empirically examines the impact of the common institution ownership on the excess goodwill of the listed companies.The findings show that the ownership of common institutions can effectively inhibit the excess goodwill of the listed companies.It is found through further study that the inhibiting effect of the common institution ownership on the excess goodwill is largely achieved through the scale effect mechanism and the exit threating mechanism.The common institutional ownership can reduce the risk of goodwill impairment after corporate mergers and acquisitions.Therefore,the listed companies should actively introduce the common institution investors,improve the corporate governance,optimize the merger targets,and suppress the excess goodwill.