不对称联盟管理的弱国议价机制——以美国联盟体系为例

The Bargaining Mechanism of Weak Allies Under the Asymmetric Alliance Management: A Case Study of the US Alliance System

联盟管理本质上是联盟成员为实现自身效益最大化同对方议价的动态过程。美国联盟体系中曾出现一些相对弱势的联盟成员冒着得罪美国的风险同联盟所针对的第三方国家进行军备贸易的反常现象,理解这一现象需要厘清不对称联盟管理中弱国与强国议价时的策略选择及因果条件。在既有研究基础上,作者提出关于不对称联盟管理中弱国议价机制的分析框架,认为弱国发射的议价信号可分为直接对抗和间接对抗两种类型,前者是弱国坚决维护自身利益的行为,后者是弱国维护自身利益的意志薄弱行为。弱国的选择受联盟地位和利益分歧影响:联盟地位低的弱国倾向于在利益分歧大时向强国发射直接对抗信号,在利益分歧小时向强国发射间接对抗信号;联盟地位高的弱国在议价信号选择上受利益分歧影响不明显,无论利益分歧大小此类弱国均倾向于向强国发射间接对抗信号。对美土同盟、美泰同盟、美法同盟和美以同盟四个案例的经验检验发现,仅有土耳其(2014—2019年)和泰国的敏感性军备贸易成功完成,即向美国发射了直接对抗信号;而土耳其(2011—2013年)、法国和以色列的敏感性军备贸易以失败告终,即向美国发射了间接对抗信号。在美国联盟体系中联盟地位低且同美国利益分歧大的国家是中国分化美国联盟体系、缓解美国对华战略压力的理性选择对象。

Alliance management is essentially a dynamic process in which alliance members bargain with other parties in order to maximize their own benefits. There have been some abnormal phenomena in the US alliance system. For example,the relatively weak alliance members conduct arms trade with third countries targeted by the alliance at the risk of offending the United States. In order to understand such phenomena,it is necessary to understand the strategy selection and causal conditions of the bargaining between the weak countries and the powerful one in managing the asymmetric alliance.On the basis of existing research,we propose an analytical framework for the bargaining mechanism of the weak countries in the management of asymmetric alliances. It is believed that the bargaining signals released by the weak countries can be divided into two types: direct confrontational signals and indirect confrontational signals. The former refers to behaviors that reflect weak countries’ resoluteness of safeguarding their own interests. The latter,on the contrary,is influenced by alliance status and interest divergence. When its alliance status is low,the weak country tends to send direct confrontational signals to the powerful country while their interests are proudly divergent,and tends to send indirect confrontational signals to the powerful country while their interest divergence is small. When the alliance status is high,the role of interest divergence on the weak country’s selection of bargaining signals is not obvious. The weak country tends to send indirect confrontational signals to the powerful country in one way or the other. The analysis of the four cases, namely, the US-Turkey Alliance,the US-Thailand Alliance,the US-France Alliance and the US-Israel Alliance,finds that only Turkey(2014-2019) and Thailand have successfully completed sensitive arms trade by sending direct confrontational signal to the United States. Turkey(2011-2014),France,and Israel’s sensitive military trade ended in failure by sending indirect confrontational signal to the United States. A country with low status in the US alliance system and great interest divergence with the US is a rational choice for China to split the US alliance system and alleviate the US strategic pressure on China.