网络平台互动与股价崩盘风险:“沟通易”还是“操纵易”

Online Platform Interaction and Stock Price Crash Risk:“Easy Communication”or“Easy Manipulation”

近年来,越来越多的上市公司涉嫌利用网络平台互动“蹭热点”以推高股价。基于此,本文利用企业在“互动易”和“上证e互动”回答投资者提问的数据,检验网络平台互动对企业股价崩盘风险的影响,以揭示旨在便利沟通的网络平台互动是否可能沦为管理层私利动机下操纵信息披露的工具。研究发现,企业在网络平台互动中回答问题的数量越多,其股价崩盘风险越高。在工具变量法、Placebo检验、改变衡量指标及调整检验样本等一系列检验后这一结论仍然成立。拓展性分析发现,网络平台互动对股价崩盘风险的影响主要存在于市值较小、财务风险较高及媒体关注度较低的企业;随着企业在网络平台互动中回答问题的数量增加,管理层当年更可能减持股份且减持人数和减持比例显著更高,管理层的薪酬水平也显著更高且薪酬业绩敏感性降低;同时,机构投资者显著增加了对企业的调研次数并降低了期末持股比例,审计师则显著提高了年度财务报表的审计费用。本文的研究为企业管理层可能通过操纵网络平台互动信息披露以寻求个人私利提供了新证据,拓展了有关互联网沟通的经济后果和股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究,对进一步加强监管以优化网络平台互动行为具有重要的现实启示。

In recent years,more and more listed companies have used online interaction platforms to push up stock prices through newsjaking. Based on this phenomenon,this paper empirically tests the impact of online platform interaction on the stock price crash risk,so as to reveal whether the online platform interaction which is aimed at facilitating communication may become a tool for manipulating information disclosure motivated by the private interests of management.The results show that the more questions a firm answers on the online interactive platform,the higher its stock price crash risk. This effect always exists in a series of robustness tests,such as instrumental variable method,placebo test,and adjusting test samples. Extensive analyses find that,the impact of online platform interaction on the stock price crash risk mainly exists in firms with smaller market value,higher financial risk and lower media attention;With the increase of the number of questions answered by firms on the interactive platform,the management is more likely to reduce shares in the year,and the number and proportion of share reduction are significantly higher,the salary level of the management is also significantly higher and the sensitivity of salary performance is reduced;At the same time,institutional investors significantly increase the number of investigations on firms and reduced the shareholding ratio at the end of the period,while auditors significantly increase the audit fees of the annual financial statements. The above conclusions not only provide new evidence that firm management may seek personal interests by manipulating the information disclosure of online platform interaction,and expand the research on the economic consequences of internet communication and the influencing factors of stock price crash risk,but also have important practical enlightenment for further strengthening supervision to optimize the construction of the online interactive platform.