责任分担与利益置换:非对称联盟中从属国与主导国安全保障的互动逻辑

Sharing Responsibilities and Benefits:The Dynamic Logic of Security Guarantees between Leading and Small States within Asymmetric Alliances

文章探讨的核心问题是,在非对称联盟中,处于同一联盟体系中的从属国,在面临共同的安全威胁、有相近的安全诉求且均有利益置换意愿的前提下,为何其所获得的安全保障程度呈现明显的差异?文章提出责任分担和利益置换是影响从属国获得安全保障存在差异的关键变量,从属国的责任分担意愿关系到主导国安全保障成本的高低,而从属国利益置换的意愿则对主导国提供安全保障的收益构成影响。通过将自变量与因变量分别进行细化分类,考察了当责任分担与利益置换意愿处于不同程度时,安全保障的分布情况,文章指出,当从属国对责任分担并与主导国利益置换的意愿均较高时,可获得主导国较高的安全保障;反之,获得的安全保障程度低。当从属国的责任分担意愿高但与主导国的利益置换意愿低,或从属国的责任分担意愿低但与主导国的利益置换意愿高时,只能获取有限的安全保障。文章考察了特朗普执政后美国—波兰联盟与美国—德国联盟,以及亚太联盟体系中的美国—日本联盟、美国—菲律宾联盟,对这四个案例中从属国获得安全保障的波动和差异情况进行了论证。

The central question considered in this article is why small states that are members of the same asymmetric alliance,have similar types of security needs and levels of willingness to engage in trade-offs to secure support,receive very different levels of security guarantees when confronted with a common security threat.This article assumes that cost-sharing and the exchange of interests are the key variables determining differences in the security guarantees obtained by small states.The willingness of small states to share the burden has direct implications for the costs that the alliance leader must undertake in providing a security guarantee.Meanwhile,the willingness of a small state to make trade-offs in exchange for security support further impacts cost-benefit considerations of the leading state.By carefully controlling interaction effects between the independent and dependent variables,this article assesses the degree to which cost sharing and interest trade-offs each impact the distribution of security guarantees.Three assumptions are made:(1)when the willingness of a small state to share burdens and make trade-offs are both high,the state can secure a strong security guarantee;(2)in the opposite situation,the state will receive only a minimal guarantee.(3)When small states are willing to share burdens,but not willing to make trade-offs,or when they are not willing to share burdens,but are willing to make trade-offs,they are able to obtain a limited guarantee.The article examines these assumptions looking at four cases:the U.S.-Poland and U.S.-German Alliances following the Trump Administration;and the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Philippines Alliances within the U.S.Asia Pacific Alliance.