需求信息不对称下基于战略库存的信息披露与契约选择

Information Disclosure and Contract Selection under Asymmetric Information with Strategic Inventory

在考虑市场需求信息为零售商私有信息的基础上,研究了制造商和零售商之间的两阶段动态博弈问题,其中零售商进行信息披露和战略库存决策,而制造商则决定合适的批发价格承诺契约或动态契约。通过对比分析信息披露与不披露两种情形下不同定价契约的博弈均衡决策及供应链各方利润,发现:零售商在实际市场规模小于其均值时披露需求信息、大于其均值时不披露需求信息;无论零售商是否披露信息,制造商通过使期望利润最大化,始终会选择动态定价契约;信息不披露条件下,若单位库存持有成本大于某一阈值或实际市场规模小于某一阈值,零售商则不会持有战略库存。最终通过数值分析,发现零售商的披露决策总能使供应链的总体利润增加;且信息不披露条件下零售商第一阶段的订货量以及战略库存持有量都要高于信息披露情形,而制造商两阶段的定价始终小于信息披露情形。

Inventory management is a critical part of the supply chain operation,and holding inventory is generally regarded as a passive choice of retailer in distribution channel.In fact,inventory may also be treated strategically as a means by the retailer to respond to manufacturer’s dynamic pricing.At the same time,the above behaviors of inventory and dynamic pricing are often influenced by the asymmetry of demand information.Therefore,a two-period dynamic game between one retailer and one manufacturer with the retailer owning demand information privately is researched.In this game,the retailer decides whether to disclose demand information and how much strategic inventory to be held,and the manufacturer chooses the better contract between commitment contract and dynamic contract.By using the method of reverse solution,the optimal decisions and profits of both players in the game are obtained.Through comparing the implication on strategic inventory and profits for both players as well as the whole supply chain under different decisions made by both players,the results show that the retailer will disclose demand information when the actual market scale is less than its mean value,and she won’t disclose the demand information when the actual market scale is greater than its mean value.No matter if the retailer chooses information disclosure or not,the manufacturer always prefers dynamic contract which can maximize his expected profit.When the retailer chooses not to disclose the demand information,she will not hold strategic inventory when the unit holding cost is too high or the actual market scale is too small.Finally,numerical analysis is employed,and other interesting results are found:The retailer’s disclosure decisions always have a positive impact on supply chain profits;besides,when the retailer decides not to disclose the information,her order quantity in the first stage and strategic inventory are always greater than which under the situation of information disclosure,and the manufacturer’s wholesale price is always lower than which under the situation of information disclosure.