考虑成本共担的复杂产品零部件协同创新Stackelberg优化研究

Stackelberg Optimization for Spare Parts’s Collaborative Innovation of Complex Products Considering Cost Sharing

在技术不断升级改造背景下,复杂产品作为高端装备产品的代表,它的工艺技术创新水平在一定程度上代表了制造业的技术水平。由数以万计的零部件所组成的复杂产品在生产研发过程中,零部件的生产创新直接决定复杂产品的生产创新,而如何从供应链角度去研究零部件生产协同问题来实现复杂产品的生产协同成为难点。本文基于复杂产品协同制造模式,从主制造商激励视角出发,考虑零部件的工艺创新和装备创新,研究主制造商成本共担机制下复杂产品零部件的协同创新问题。首先,为激励供应商进行创新积极性,通过设计创新程度相关参数,依据零部件工艺创新程度和装配创新程度构建了复杂产品生产函数,探讨了主制造商成本共担激励策略,建立了基于成本共担协同创新Stackelberg博弈模型;其次,借助于成本共担与不共担情形下对比研究了最优创新程度水平以及主制造商最佳成本共担比例;最后,借助某商用飞机电力支持系统进行数值验证,结果表明:供应商最优成本共担比例和工艺弹性和装配弹性呈正比,最优工艺创新程度和装配创新程度与工艺弹性和装配弹性呈反比例关系,当弹性在一定范围变动时,成本共担要比成本不共担要好;当弹性超过变动范围时,则不再分担成本进行激励。本文系统分析了成本分担下零部件创新程度问题,为供应商和主制造商长期激励合作提供了一定决策依据。

Under the background of the technical upgrading,complex products as a representative of high-end manufacturing industry,to some extent,its industrial technological level represents the technological level of manufacturing industry.In the process of production and development of complex products which are composed of tens of thousands of spare parts,the production innovation of spare parts directly determines the production innovation of complex products,and how to study the production collaboration of spare parts from the perspective of supply chain to achieve the production collaboration of complex products has become a difficulty in the research process.Due to this reason,Based on the collaborative manufacturing mode of complex products,the collaborative innovation of complex product parts is studied under the cost sharing mechanism of the main manufacturer in the incentive of the main manufacturer mechanism,which considers the process innovation and equipment innovation of parts.Firstly,in order to motive the supplier to innovate more actively,the production function of the complex products is constructed in accordance with the degree of technological innovation and assembly innovation which is about the parts and components,meanwhile,the some relevant parameters of innovation degree is designed,then the cost-sharing incentive strategy of the main manufacturer is discussed and a Stackelberg model of collaborative innovation is built which based on the cost-sharing.Secondly,the optimal innovation level of and the optimal cost-sharing ratio of the main manufacturer are studied in the case of cost-sharing and non-sharing.Finally,the simulation results of a aircraft power support system show that the optimal cost-sharing ratio of the main manufacturer is proportional to the process elasticity and assembly elasticity,while the optimal degree of process innovation and assembly innovation are inversely proportional to the process elasticity and assembly elasticity.When the elasticity varies in a certain range,the cost-sharing situation is better than non-sharing situation.When it exceeds the certain range,the optimal choice is on-sharing situation.The innovation degree of parts and components is systematically analyzed under cost-sharing,which will provide a decision basis for long-term incentive cooperation between the supplier and the main manufacturer.