基于“云排队”的经济效益分析

The Economics of Cloud Queueing System

随着各种云智能排队预约系统的推出,顾客“排队难”的问题得到了极大的缓解。其简便的操作方式,受到了大量商家与顾客的好评。本文基于当下热门服务行业的运营模式,建立排队博弈模型,从理论上分析了“云排队”平台对顾客以及服务商的影响。本文主要得到了以下几个结果:(1)给出了两类顾客的纳什均衡策略(包括进队策略与最优到达间隔);(2)发现当前的预约机制能够提高“线上”顾客的效用,并刺激更多的线上顾客购买该产品,但同时也降低了“线下”顾客的进队意愿;(3)发现在云排队机制下服务商的收益将大大提高,同时该机制将刺激服务商收取更高的服务费用。

With the rise of intelligent reservation systems in congestion-prone service systems,the phenomena of“long waiting time”have been greatly alleviated.The simple operation of cloud queueing system has been well accepted by a large number of businesses and customers.A queuing-game model is established,and the impact of“cloud queuing system”on customers and service provider is analyzed theoretically in the framework of the current popular service industries.The following results are obtained in this paper.First,the equilibrium strategies for two types of customers are characterized.Second,it is found that the prevalence of cloud queueing can encourage the online customers to join,but it worsens the utilities of offline customers,and reduce their enthusiasm.Third,the revenue of service provider can be improved in the presence of cloud queueing,and a higher price should be set accordingly.