摘要
针对网约车平台在需求高峰时段采取给予网约车司机补贴的实际背景,进行了网约车平台的最优峰时补贴策略选择研究。考虑采取平台单独补贴司机策略、乘客单独补贴司机策略、平台与乘客同时补贴司机策略的情况下,分别构建网约车平台的利润模型,通过最大化平台利润得到了三种情况下的最优决策。通过分析和比较三种情况下网约车平台的最优决策发现:当乘客潜在的市场规模较小时,应采用平台单独补贴司机策略;当乘客潜在的市场规模适中时,应采用平台与乘客同时补贴司机策略;当乘客潜在的市场规模较大时,应采用乘客单独补贴司机策略。此外,本文还进一步考察了乘客潜在市场规模、补贴敏感程度等因素对于最优决策下的补贴额度、需求与供给、平台利润和社会福利的影响。所得到的研究结果,对于网约车平台峰时补贴策略的选择和补贴价格的确定具有重要的指导价值。
Surge subsidy strategies are frequently adopted by the ride-hailing platform when the supplement of drivers is not sufficient during the surge demand period.According to the different sources of subsidy cost,surge subsidy strategies can be classified into three categories,i.e.,platform subsidizing drivers strategy,passengers subsidizing drivers strategy,platform and passengers simultaneously subsidizing drivers strategy.Which surge subsidy strategy should be adopted under a given market scenario?It is worth to conduct the research on surge subsidy strategy of ride-hailing platform.In this paper,a monopoly ride-hailing platform with two-sides of users is considered,where the one side is passengers and the other side is drivers.Giving the situations that the supplement of drivers is not sufficient,the models for maximizing profit of the ride-hailing platform are constructed considering that each of the three possible subsidy strategies is carried out.Then,by solving the models,the optimal subsidy given by the platform or/and passengers can be obtained.Further,by comparing the profits of platform under different subsidy strategies,the optimal subsidy strategy is analyzed under different market scenarios.On this basis,how several factors(such as passenger market size,subsidy sensitivity)affect optimal subsidy strategy,optimal subsidy given by the platform or/and passengers,demand and supply,platform’s profit is examined.Finally,some numerical studies are conducted to show the impacts of passenger market size and different optimal subsidy strategies on social welfare.Several important results are shown through the theoretical analysis.First,when the potential market size of passengers is small,the platform should adopt platform subsidizing drivers strategy;when the potential market size of passengers is moderate,the platform should adopt platform and passengers simultaneously subsidizing drivers strategy;when the potential market size of passengers is large,the platform should adopt passengers subsidizing drivers strategy.Second,subsidy sensitivities of passengers and drivers will affect the optimal subsidy amounts undertook by passengers and drivers.Thus,the platform should fully consider subsidy sensitivities of passengers and drivers when the platform makes the decision on subsidy amounts.Third,the social welfare under the subsidy strategy is always greater than that if the platform does not adopt any subsidy strategy.Thus,the government and relevant departments should encourage the platform to adopt desirable subsidy strategy when the supplement of drivers is not sufficient.
作者
刘洋
邓前前
樊治平
张琦
LIU Yang;DENG Qian-qian;FAN Zhi-ping;ZHANG Qi(School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China;School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第7期210-220,共11页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72031002,72171034)。
关键词
网约车平台
峰时补贴
最优策略
市场规模
ride-hailing platform
surge subsidy
optimal strategy
market size