摘要
本文基于避税代理观理论分析了企业金融化的动因,以“金税三期”刻画企业避税活动的减少并作为准自然实验,以2008~2015年A股上市公司为初始样本进行实证检验。研究结果显示,减少避税活动可以抑制实体企业金融化。具体检验其影响机制发现,减少避税活动通过降低企业可支配现金流和代理成本两条路径抑制了实体企业金融化程度。进一步证据显示,在税收征管强度较高、分析师关注度较高、内部控制质量较高以及管理层持股激励较高的情境下,减少避税活动能够更为显著地抑制实体企业金融化。研究结论对政府部门进一步优化财税金融制度、引导企业“脱虚向实”具有借鉴意义。
This article analyzes the motivations of corporate financialization based on the panel data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015. Taking the companies’ connection to“Golden Tax phase III”,China’s digital tax system,as a quasi-natural experiment,the article finds that reducing tax avoidance activities can inhibit the financialization of enterprises by reducing the disposable cash flow and agency cost of enterprises. Further evidence shows that the inhibitive effect is more significant in the companies with higher tax collection pressure,more analyst attention,higher internal control quality,and stronger incentive of management shareholding.
作者
范润
孙雪娇
FAN Run;SUN Xuejiao(Schol of Acounting,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjn,300204,China)
出处
《金融评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期79-101,126,共24页
Chinese Review of Financial Studies
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“向上盈余管理与激进避税行为交互关系识别与股票定价研究”(项目批准号:71402114)的资助。
关键词
避税活动
实体企业金融化
代理问题
准自然实验
Tax Avoidance
Financialization
Principal-Agency Problem
Quasi-Natural Experiment