道德共同体、动物权利与契约论:人工智能权利的合理性分析

Moral Community,Animal Rights,and Contract Theory:An Analysis on the Rationality of Artificial Intelligence Rights

从道德共同体、动物权利、契约论等角度出发,可以发现人工智能权利具有一定的合理性。首先,人工智能可能具有利益以及确实对人类有益,所以未来人工智能具有与人类形成互惠关系利益体的可能,从而得到道德关怀,加入道德共同体。其次,从动物权利的合理性可以看出,物种的差异并不能完全决定何种个体才能拥有权利。未来人工智能可能比动物更接近于人,进而可以和动物一样获得权利。最后,从罗尔斯契约论角度出发,假设存在一种“原初状态”,将人与有理性的人工智能放入其中,在“无知之幕”下,二者可能会基于理性的自我利益与兴趣的考量,本着相互性需要对社会规则达成一致,从而使人工智能的权利得以体现。因此,人类有理由考虑将虚拟的道德代理与道德责任延伸至与我们自身相似的非人类实体上,承认人工智能的权利。

The rationality of artificial intelligence rights is demonstrated from the perspective of moral community,animal rights,and contract theory.In the future,it is likely that artificial intelligence may form a kind of common interest body with a generally reciprocal relationship with human beings,so as to get moral care and join the moral human community.Secondly,the practice of animal rights shows that the differences of species cannot completely determine which individuals can have rights.In the future,artificial intelligence may be in a much closer relation with humans than any other animals,thus being able to enjoy the same rights as animals.Finally,according to contract theory by John Bordley Rawls,it can be assumed that there is a“original position”,and human and rational artificial intelligence could be put into it.Under the“veil of ignorance”,the mankind and artificial intelligence may agree on social rules in mutual needs based on rational self-interest and shared interests.This embodies the right of artificial intelligence.Therefore,human beings have all the reasons to consider extending virtual moral agency and moral responsibility to non-human entities similar to themselves,thus recognizing the rights of Artificial Intelligence.