控股股东股权质押、分析师预测与审计收费

Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge,Analyst Forecast and Audit Fees

本文获取了2007至2020年全部A股上市公司控股股东股权质押数据,实证研究控股股东股权质押与审计收费的关系并探讨分析师预测行为在二者关系之间的调节作用,最终得出结论为:控股股东股权质押与审计收费二者呈显著正相关;分析师预测准确度削弱二者之间的正相关关系;同时,当分析师预测存在乐观偏差倾向时,控股股东股权质押与审计收费的正相关关系会更加强烈。本文不仅在传统的控股股东即审计客户与审计师的双方角色之外考察了分析师这一角色,凸显分析师的公司外部治理效应,也对分析师预测行为进一步细化,考察分析师预测行为的具体调节作用,丰富已有关于股权质押影响的研究。

Based on the data of equity pledge of controlling shareholders of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020,this paper empirtically studies the relationship between equity pledge of controlling shareholders and audit fees and disc us ses the moderating effect of analyst forecasting behavior on the relationship between the two.The following conclusions are drawn:there is a significant positive correlation between controlling shareholders equity pledge and audit fees;When other conditions remain unchanged,the positive correlation between the two is weakened by the accuracy of analyst's forecasts.Meanwhile,the positive correlation between controlling shareholders equity pledge and audit fees will be stronger when the analysfs forecast has optimistic bias.Not only is the role of analyst,besides two traditional roles of the controlling shareholder of the audit client and the auditor,is investigated to highlight the company's external governance effect of analysts,but also this paper also further refines analysts5 forecasting behavior,examines the specific moderating effect of analysts'forecasting behavior,and enriches existing studies on the economic consequences of controlling shareholders5 equity pledge.