能源政治中的制裁与反制裁——围绕美国制裁跨西伯利亚管道和北溪2号管道的多方博弈

Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions in Energy Politics:The Multi-party Game around the U.S. Sanctions on the Trans-Siberian Pipeline and the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline

制裁与反制裁的博弈主体和影响因素是多元而复杂的。在开放经济条件下,由于商业利益的跨国融合和彼此交织,制裁与反制裁博弈会模糊以国家为边界的利益划分,而商业行为体能够形成跨国集体行动来影响国家行为体之间的博弈过程和结果。本文基于“奥尔森命题”提出商业行为体形成反制裁行动的自发型和组织型模式,并通过美国制裁跨西伯利亚管道和北溪2号管道两个案例进行检验。集团规模和选择性激励是决定商业行为体能否采取反制裁行动的两大核心因素。制裁与反制裁的博弈结果取决于强化和弱化制裁影响的两股力量的相互角力。一方面,商业行为体的跨国反制裁行动能够改变发起国施加制裁的成本与收益。当制裁变得无利可图、甚至得不偿失时,发起国会做出政策调整、妥协让步甚至最终取消制裁。另一方面,发起国扩大和升级制裁范围及力度能够改变商业行为体的反制裁成本与收益。当反制裁的成本超过收益时,反制裁联盟的成员会选择退出,这将降低商业行为体跨国反制裁行动的有效性。

The game subjects and influencing factors of sanctions and countersanctions are diverse and complex. Under the conditions of an open economy, due to the cross-border integration and interweaving of commercial interests, the game of sanctions and counter-sanctions will blur the division of interests based on state, and commercial actors can form transnational collective actions that will affect the game process among state actors. Based on the “Olson Proposition,” this article proposes a spontaneous and organizational model for commercial actors to form anti-sanction actions, and tests them through two cases of U.S. sanctions, the Trans-Siberian and the Nord Stream 2 Pipelines. Group size and selective incentives are two central factors that determine whether a business actor can take counter-sanction actions. The outcome of the game between sanctions and counter-sanctions depends on the mutual struggle between the two forces that strengthen and weaken the impact of sanctions. On one hand, transnational counter-sanction actions by commercial actors can alter the costs and benefits of sanctions. On the other hand, sanctioners can change the costs and benefits by expanding and escalating the scope and intensity of sanctions. When the costs of counter-sanctions outweigh the benefits, members of the anti-sanction coalition opt out, thus reducing the effectiveness of cross-border counter-sanctions by commercial actors.