考虑不同消费者选择行为和以旧换新补贴的产品动态定价策略研究

Dynamic Pricing Strategy During Trade-Ins Based on Different Consumer’s Choice Behavior and Different Subsidy Methods

以旧换新过程中,考虑以旧换新折抵的产品动态定价策略是企业面临的关键问题之一。从博弈论视角出发,同时考虑短视消费者和策略消费者,在无补贴、企业补贴、政府补贴3种情形下,构建企业和消费者之间的两阶段动态博弈模型,探讨不同补贴方式对两类消费者选择行为和企业最优动态定价策略的影响。研究表明:短视消费者的比例越大,企业对第一代新产品的定价越低,对第二代新产品的定价越高;购买第一代新产品的消费者,在第2个销售周期内不都参与以旧换新;和政府补贴相比,企业补贴能更有效地激励消费者参与以旧换新。

One of the key problems in the process of trade-ins is dynamic pricing strategy.From the angle of game theory,three situations of no trade-in subsidy,firm’s trade-in subsidy,and government’s tradein subsidy were considered.Then a two-stage dynamic game model between firm and consumers was constructed to analyze the impact of different subsidies on two types of consumers’ choice behavior and firm’s optimal dynamic pricing strategy.The result shows that:(1)the larger of the proportion of myopic consumers,the lower pricing of the first generation new products,and the higher pricing of the second generation new products;(2)not all of the consumers who have bought the first generation new products participate in the trade-ins in the second period;(3)comparing with the government’s trade-in subsidy,the firm’s trade-in subsidy can more effectively motivate consumers to engage in trade-ins.