基于Moran过程的矿工安全行为随机演化动态

Random evolution dynamics of miners’ safety behavior based on Moran process

为了降低人因事故发生,以演化博弈理论为基础,构建基于Moran过程的安全行为策略博弈模型,利用MATLAB模拟动态博弈过程中矿工安全行为策略的随机演化趋势,分析促进矿工采取安全行为策略的有利条件。结果表明:外部随机干扰性越小,采取安全行为策略净收益越大;监管力度越大,风险成本越大,采取不安全行为策略净收益越小;心理损失越小,矿工采取安全行为策略的固定概率越大,有利于抑制不安全行为发生。

In order to study the random evolution trend of miners adopting safe behavior strategies under the condition of limited number of miners. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a Moran process-based safety behavior strategy game model, aiming to explore the favorable conditions for miners to adopt safety behavior strategies. The study found that the smaller the external random interference, the greater the net benefit of adopting a safe behavior strategy, the greater the supervision, the greater the risk cost, the smaller the net benefit of adopting an unsafe behavior strategy, and the smaller the psychological loss.The larger the fixed probability, the more effective the unsafe behavior will be. The research results are verified by numerical analysis, and corresponding management suggestions are proposed for the management and control of miners’ unsafe behavior.