儒家伦理中的尊严观念及其当代意义

The Confucian Concept of Human Dignity and Its Contemporary Significance

人的尊严是当代伦理、政治和法律研究中的重要概念。然而至今,人们对于尊严的内涵仍有着完全不同甚至截然相反的理解,这一现状为相关研究带来困扰。儒家伦理思想是当代具有广泛影响的伦理学理论,其尊严观念为反思各种尊严理论提供了重要视角。在儒家伦理中,人类尊严的基础是每个人先天具有的道德潜力。每个人在相同程度上具有道德潜力,因而平等地具有普遍尊严;同时,一个人在越大的程度上发展了道德潜力,就能够在越大的程度上拥有获得性尊严。普遍尊严是一种道德地位,而获得性尊严不是。追求获得性尊严是普遍尊严的道德要求,并且为普遍尊严提供必要的保护。儒家的尊严观念有助于论证人类道德地位的平等性,从而为应对当代科技和社会发展带来的伦理难题提供重要的理论资源。

Human dignity is a crucial concept in contemporary ethical, political and legal studies. However, people have different, even opposite understandings of human dignity, which has caused lots of confusion in related discourses. Confucianism is a very influential ethical thought system and the Confucian notion of human dignity provides an important perspective for reflecting various theories of human dignity. In Confucian ethics, the basis of human dignity is the moral potential that every human being naturally has. Moral potential grants everyone universal dignity, while the development of moral potential grants people acquired dignity. Since all human beings have moral potential to the same extent, everyone owns universal dignity equally. Different people develop their moral potential to different extents. One’s acquired dignity is positively associated with the development of her moral potential. Universal dignity is a moral status but acquired dignity is not. To pursue acquired dignity is the moral demand of universal dignity and protects people’s universal dignity. Confucian discussions on human dignity provide a way to justify the equality of human moral status, thereby constituting a reliable theoretical basis for coping with ethical issues caused by the development of society and technologies today.