薪酬差距与企业金融化的非线性影响机制研究

A Study on the Non-linear Influence Mechanism Between theSalary Gap and the Corporate Financialization

为探究薪酬差距这个带有激励色彩的因素,是否有助于缓解管理层的过度金融化,论文先是构建了一个理论模型来说明薪酬差距与企业金融化可能存在U型非线性关系,而后以沪深A股2009~2017年上市公司的16371个观测数据为样本进行实证检验。研究发现:薪酬差距与企业金融化存在显著U型非线性关系,过高和过低的薪酬差距激励都会造成管理层过度金融化,从而导致企业创新投入的挤占和企业生产本质的偏离。进一步研究显示,薪酬差距与企业金融化这种U型非线性关系,主要表现在低管理者代理行为、无缺陷内部控制和有审计委员会等较好公司治理的企业,而在高管理者代理行为、有缺陷内部控制和无审计委员会等弱公司治理的企业,虽有U型非线性关系但不显著。

In order to explore whether the salary gap,an incentive factor,will help to alleviate the management excessive financialization,the paper first constructs a theoretical model to illustrate that there may be a U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization.Then,the article takes 16371 observation data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share during 2009~2017 as samples for empirical test.The research finds that there is a significant U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization.Too large and too small salary gap incentives will lead to managerment excessive financialization,which will result in the squeeze of enterprise innovation investment and the deviation of enterprise production essence.The further research shows that the U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the salary gap and the corporate financialization is mainly reflected in the enterprises with better corporate governance,such as low agency behavior,flawless internal control and audit committees.Meanwhile,though the enterprises with weak corporate governance,such as high agency behavior,defective internal controls and non-audit committees,have U-shaped nonlinear relationship,it is not significant.