税收分成、地方政府行为与全要素生产率——基于273个地级市的检验

Tax Sharing,Local Government Behavior,and Total Factor Productivity——Based on 273 Cities

本文基于财政激励的视角,以增值税的分成变化为核心,将税收分成、地方政府行为和全要素生产率纳入同一个分析框架,研究了中国财政分权下的税收分成制度对全要素生产率的影响。通过测算2000—2011年的税收分成和全要素生产率数据,分析了税收分成方式的改变对地方政府行为的影响,并验证了其具体影响全要素生产率的传导机制。结果表明市县增值税分成比例的提高,客观上抑制了全要素生产率的提高,通过机制分析验证了增值税分成比例的提高会驱动地方政府追加生产建设领域的投资,而忽视了公共民生领域,从而降低了全要素生产率。异质性分析还发现,对自有财力依赖度较高和第二产业占比较高的地级市更有动机改变其财政支出结构,会对全要素生产率产生更大的不利影响。

This paper integrates tax sharing,local government behavior and total factor productivity into the same analytical framework.From the perspective of fiscal incentive,this paper studies the influence of tax sharing system under fiscal decentralization on total factor productivity in China.Through calculating the data of tax sharing and total factor productivity from 2000 to 2011,this paper analyzes the impact of the change of tax sharing on local government behavior,and verifies the transmission mechanism of specific impact on total factor productivity.The results show that the increase of city and county VAT share ratio objectively inhibits the increase of total factor productivity.Through mechanism analysis,it is verified that the increase of VAT share ratio will drive the local government to increase the investment in production and construction,while ignoring the public livelihood area,thus reducing total factor productivity.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the cities with higher dependence on their own financial resources and higher proportion of secondary industry are more motivated to change their structure of fiscal expenditure,which has a greater negative impact on total factor productivity.