最低工资制度、劳动合同期限与企业用工形式

Minimum Wage,Labor Contract Term and Employment Pattern

通过构建可检验的理论模型以及严谨的实证分析,本文研究了最低工资制度强化对企业用工决策中选择劳动合同期限并调整内部用工结构的影响及其内在作用机制。我们发现,工资水平的上涨降低了企业雇用长期工的概率,增加了企业雇用临时工的概率,从而导致了企业用工形式的短期化。工资制度的变化进一步加强了这种效应。进一步研究表明,企业雇用更多的退休返聘职工、更多发放不固定工资、职工更频繁地更换工作是其中的内在作用机制。本文还发现,低收入群体的就业形式受到更大的影响。政府在制定最低工资时,应权衡其在劳动收入保障上的积极效果及其对企业用工形式短期化影响的潜在弊端。

This paper analyzes firms’recruitment decisions on terms of labor contract and types of employees when faced with strengthened regulations on minimum wage.We first present a model featuring firms that has different recruitment and layoff cost when hiring temporary,contractual,or termless employee.We derive two testable predictions.First,the increase in minimum wage depresses firms’willingness to hire long-term employees,while the second,this minimum wage effect is more borne by workers with less skills.We present strong empirical evidence in support of our model predictions.Moreover,we find that,rehiring retired employees,paying unfixed wages,and frequent career switch are factors driving the minimum wage effect.Our findings have important policy implications for policymakers in improving the social security systems.