低腐败成本与道德失灵:资源反哺时代农村基层腐败的内生逻辑

Low Cost of Corruption and Self-moralization:The Internal Logic of Rural Grassroots Corruption in the Era of Resource Feedback

基于腐败机会与成本理论的分析框架,结合农村基层腐败案例的实证分析,研究认为,农村自治组织已成为乡镇公共事务的协助者与承担者,国家资源下沉增加了基层干部的资源分配垄断权力和自由裁量权。在政绩考核压力下,基层政府可能产生对村干部违纪违法行为的默契性容忍,弱化了基层监督;低薪与发展空间不足,以及乡村人情与传统伦理等因素,减少了基层腐败的机会成本,加剧了干部的道德失灵现象;农村基层腐败体现出低成本与道德失灵的特点。这些内外因素的共同作用增加了农村基层腐败的风险。完善基层自治、强化自下而上的监督、改善激励约束机制等有助于减少农村基层的腐败问题。

Based on the theory of corruption opportunities and cost analysis framework and an empirical analysis case about rural grass-roots corruption,this study suggests that country resources sinking have greatly increased the grassroots cadres resources distribution monopoly power and discretion,rural autonomous organizations have become the collaborators and undertakers of the township governmental affairs.Under the pressure of performance assessment,the grass-roots government may have tacit tolerance to the violations of discipline and law by village cadres,which weakened grass-roots level supervision;low salary and lack of career development space,as well as rural favors and traditional ethics reduce the opportunity cost of corruption and strengthen the moral failure of cadres,so the rural grass-roots corruption reflects the characteristics of low cost and moral failure.The mutual influence of these internal and external factors incveases the occurrence risk of rural grass-roots corruption.Perfecting grass-roots autonomy,strengthening bottom-up supervision and improving incentive and restraint mechanism are helpful to reduce corruption in rural area.