新加坡集选区制的政治后果——基于1988年以来八次大选结果的分析

The Political Consequences of Singapore’s Group Representation Constituency:An Analysis Based on Adjustments of Electoral System since 1988

政党体制与选举制度高度相关,著名的迪韦尔热定律即是对这两种制度之间相关性的概括。作为新加坡独有的选举制度设计,集选区制与人民行动党的长期执政高度相关。这种非完全竞争(或半竞争性)的选举制度安排,既适应了新加坡的政治社会结构,也极大地压缩了反对党参与选举的政治空间,确保人民行动党在选举中的绝对优势地位。论文对新加坡实行集选区制以来的七次选举制度调整进行分析,并讨论了八次大选中各党在单选区和集选区的议席情况,证实了集选区制对巩固新加坡一党独大体制的制度(或机制)影响,并探讨了新加坡式选举制度影响政党体制的具体机制。

The political party system is highly related to the electoral system,the Duverger’s law reflects the correlation between them.The Singapore’s Group Representation Constituency(GRC)is even more related to the Singapore’s political party system.GRC,a unique and semi-competitive electoral system,not only adapts to the political and social structures of Singapore,but also compresses the political space for opposition parties’electoral participation,and ensures the absolute dominant position of the people’s Action Party in the Parliament House.By analyzing seven adjustments to the electoral system,including gerrymandering,seats adjustment in the single member constituency and group representation constituency since 1988,this paper confirms the institutional impact of the GRC system on consolidating the one party dominant system and long-term governance of the People’s Action Party.