独家交易对平台内经营者销量的影响研究——来自互联网外卖平台的实证证据

Research on the Effects of Exclusive Dealings on Sales of Operators on the Platform:Empirical Evidence from Internet Catering Takeaway Platforms

互联网平台独家交易行为越来越受到反垄断部门的重视,而其经济效应较为复杂,在业界尤其是学界尚存争议。本文首先基于Hotelling模型分析独家交易前后用户的归属变化,并考虑平台赋能和品牌异质性对独家后商家销量的影响,分解其作用机制。再基于2019年互联网外卖平台的数据进行实证检验和分析,使用倾向得分匹配‑双重差分法评估了外卖平台G独家交易对平台内经营者销量影响的净效应。结果表明,独家交易通过渠道效应降低了商家的总销量,而没有出现显著的能提高商家销量的用户转移效应。因此,平台并未在销量提升上有效赋能独家交易的商家。异质性分析发现,品牌商家独家后销量受到的负面影响高于非品牌商家。研究结果可以为反垄断相关执法提供参考和支持。

Exclusive dealings of Internet platforms have aroused increasingly attention of anti‑monopoly department,the economic effects of which are complex and still controversial in the industry,especially in academia.First,based on the Hotelling model,the attribution changes of users before and after exclusive transactions were analyzed.With the consideration of the impact of platform empowerment and brand heterogeneity on the sales of merchants after exclusive dealings,its mechanisms were decomposed.Then based on the data of Internet catering takeaway platforms in an important city in the west in 2019,empirical test and analysis were carried out.It used the propensity score matching‑difference in difference approach to evaluate the net effect of exclusive dealings of catering takeaway platform G on operators’sales.The results show that exclusive dealings reduce the total sales of merchants through channel effect,and there is no significant consumer transfer effect which can increase sales of merchants.Therefore,the platform don’t effectively empowered merchants in sales growth after exclusive dealings.Through further analysis of the heterogeneity,it is found that the negative impact on sales of brands after exclusive dealing was higher than that of non‑brands.It can provide reference and support for the related anti‑monopoly execution.