平台差异化竞争与激励性排他交易

Platform Differentiation Competition and Incentive Exclusive Dealings

平台经济中交织着平台间与商家间两个层面的竞争,导致判定交易型平台的激励性排他交易是否反竞争较为困难。本文在充分考虑平台和商家两个竞争主体差异化竞争的基础上,区分激励性排他交易与商家的自主单归属行为,并以消费者福利为标准判定该行为的反竞争效应。研究发现:由于存量竞争时期面临激烈的价格竞争,平台与商家均有动机通过差异化策略来缓解竞争压力,激励性排他和自主单归属则是基于商品种类和平台服务两个层面的差异化竞争机制。激励性排他在没有平台服务质量提高和创新的情况下,会提高商品价格、限制消费者对商品和平台服务组合的选择,应被判定为限定交易。监管部门应根据平台市场中各主体所处竞争程度的不同对排他交易实行差别监管。

The coexistence of competitions among different platforms and that among different merchants makes it difficult to determine whether incentive exclusive dealing through platforms is anti-competitive.This article regards both the platforms and the merchants as competitors, and distinguishes incentive exclusive dealing from merchants’ initiative single-homing behavior.Using consumer welfare as the standard to evaluate anti-competitive effect of platforms’ exclusive dealing, this study finds that both platforms and merchants tend to reduce the tension of competition through incentive exclusive dealing and initiative single-homing behavior, two different competitive mechanisms based on two levels of commodity types and platform services.When an incentive exclusive dealing proposed by platform on the basis of its motivation increases the price and limits consumers’ choice of a combination of goods and platform services, it should be considered as a restricted transaction.Antitrust authorities should implement according supervisions on different kinds of incentive exclusive dealing based on different levels of competition between platforms and merchants.