企业间合谋的特征化事实、运作机制和监管困境——以我国“垄断协议”的行政执法实践为例

On the Characteristic Facts and Operational Mechanism of Business Collusions and the Difficulties in Supervising Them: Taking the Practice of China’s Anti-monopoly Administrative Law Enforcement Agencies as an Example

企业之间的合谋行为是我国反垄断法的重点监管对象。本文对我国行政执法机构所查处垄断协议案件的统计描述表明,价格垄断协议比例高、产业分布相对集中、行业协会主导是它们的一般特征。这些案件在合谋的机制设计层面则呈现出:正式协议较为普遍、运作方式组织化,竞争性行业案件发生率高但持续时间短,参与者之间的利益分配、处罚手段多样化等显著特点。近年来,我国行政执法机构调查和处罚了一批垄断协议案件,但由于存在免于处罚的案件比例较高、执法周期长、时效性不强、信息披露滞后等问题,未能形成一定的威慑力。本文建议增强经济学分析在查处合谋行为中的作用,以民事诉讼弥补反垄断行政执法资源的供给不足,通过公平竞争审查来阻断政府滥用行政权力和企业反竞争行为之间的关联。

Business collusions for monopoly are forbidden according to China’s anti-monopoly law.Based on the description and analysis of related cases, this article finds their general characteristics: high ratio of monopoly-price agreement, relatively concentrated industrial distribution, and the industrial association’s dominating role.We find that in these cases(1) formal agreement is more common and the operation mode is organized;(2) cases have occurred more in competitive industries, but they did not last long;and(3) they have more than one means of distributing profit corresponding with different kinds of punishment.In recent years, administrative law enforcement agencies have failed to establish authority and consequently failed to stop illegal activities.This article suggests a policy to strengthen the role of economic analysis in investigating and dealing with collusions, to deal with the issue of lack of anti-monopoly administrative enforcement resources, and to block the connection between government abuse of administrative power and business anti-competitive behavior.