大股东控制下的债务融资:抑制还是便利了大股东掏空?

Debt Financing under the Control of Major Shareholders:Inhibiting or Facilitating the Tunneling of Major Shareholders?

大股东控制企业的债务融资能够对大股东掏空产生影响。笔者以2004-2018年中国沪深A股市场中剔除了金融类等特殊类型企业后的上市公司数据,运用中介效应检验方法,从样本总体、区分借款期限以及企业所有制类型三重维度,实证检验了大股东控制企业的债务融资究竟是抑制了大股东掏空还是便利了大股东掏空。从样本总体实证检验发现:大股东控制企业通过增加借款进而导致了大股东掏空的增加。从区分借款期限实证检验发现:缘于还款期限以及对大股东的约束程度不同,短期借款和长期借款呈现不同效应。具体而言,两权分离度越高,企业短期借款越少,大股东掏空相应减少;两权分离度越高,企业长期借款越多,对大股东掏空的限制也越多。从区分企业异质性实证检验发现:由于经营机制以及受监管程度的不同,国有企业与民营企业的债务融资效应存在差异。其中,国有企业中短期和长期借款的中介效应都显著,而民营企业中短期和长期借款的中介效应都不显著。本研究运用中介效应检验方法通过实证检验,证实了大股东控制下的债务融资对大股东掏空所产生的影响。研究结论拓展了企业代理理论以及债务融资理论,能够为规范中国的债务融资市场和推进国有银行的商业化改革以及提高公司治理水平提供理论依据。

Debt financing in enterprises controlled by major shareholders can have an impact on the tunneling of major shareholders.Based on the data of enterprises excluding financial and other special types of enterprises in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2004 to 2018,the author uses the intermediary effect test method to investigate whether debt financing in companies controlled by major shareholders inhibits or facilitates the tunneling of major shareholders from the perspective of sample population, loan term and enterprise ownership type.The study found that, from the overall sample, enterprises controlled by major shareholders led to an increase in the tunneling of major shareholders by increasing loans.By distinguishing between short-term and long-term loans, due to different repayment terms and the degree of constraints on major shareholders, the effects of these two types of loans are different.The higher the separation of the two rights, the less the short-term loans of the enterprise, which can lead to the corresponding reduction of tunneling of major shareholders;the higher the separation of the two rights, the more long-term loans of the enterprise, which can restrict the major shareholders from tunneling more.Distinguishing between state-owned and private enterprises, due to the different operating mechanisms and the degree of supervision, the debt financing effects of state-owned and private enterprises are different.Among them, the intermediary effect of short-term and long-term loans of state-owned enterprises is significant, while the intermediary effect of short-term and long-term loans of private enterprises is not significant.The conclusion of this study helps to enrich the enterprise agency theory and debt financing theory, and can provide a theoretical basis for standardizing China’s debt financing market, promoting the commercialization reform of state-owned banks and improving China’s corporate governance.