非国有股东参与治理与国有企业并购绩效——基于“双向混改”情境的研究

Non-state-owned Shareholders’ Participation in Governance and M&A Performance of State-owned Enterprises:Research on the Basis of "Two-way Mixed Reform"

本文使用手工整理的2007-2018年国有A股上市公司非国有股东独特数据集,基于正式制度与非正式制度构建非国有股东治理参与度指数,分析并检验国有企业混合所有制改革情境中非国有股东参与治理对企业并购绩效的影响。研究发现,非国有股东参与治理能够提高国有企业并购决策效率和并购整合能力进而提升长期并购绩效。企业内部控制质量和经济政策不确定性分别促进和抑制了非国有股东对国有企业长期并购绩效的积极影响。此外,基于双向混改情境的对比研究发现,两种情境中异质性股东参与治理均能提高企业长期并购绩效,但正式制度和非正式制度的作用效果存在差异。本文拓展了非国有股东治理效果和并购绩效影响因素的研究,为推进混合所有制改革提供了新的经验证据。

This paper adopts the unique data set of non-state-owned shareholders of state-owned A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018, to construct the participation index of non-state-owned shareholders in governance on the basis of formal institution and informal institution, and to analyze the impact of non-state-owned shareholders’ participation in governance on the performance of enterprise M&A in the context of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. According to the research, it is found that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in governance can improve the efficiency of M&A decision-making and integration ability of state-owned enterprises, and thus improve long-term M&A performance. The internal control quality of enterprises can promote the positive impact of non-state-owned shareholders on the long-term M&A performance of state-owned enterprises, but the economic policy uncertainty can restrain the positive impact. In addition, the comparative study based on the two-way mixed reform finds that the participation of heterogeneous shareholders in governance in both scenarios is helpful to improve the long-term M&A performance of enterprises. However, the formal institution and informal institution have different effects. This paper expands the research on the factors affecting the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders and the performance of M&A, and provides new empirical evidence for promoting the reform of mixed ownership.