基于绿色技术研发的绿色供应链微分博弈及协调模型

Differential Game and Coordination Model for Green Supply Chain Based on Green Technology R&D

本文以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,建立了绿色技术研发的绿色供应链微分博弈模型,比较了集中和分散决策下的微分博弈均衡解。最后,通过动态批发价机制对绿色供应链成员进行合作协调,并采用数值仿真对结果进行了验证和说明。研究发现:(1)与分散决策相比,集中决策下绿色技术水平和绿色渠道总利润较高;(2)当协调参数在一定范围内时,动态批发价机制能够协调制造商和零售商的行为,并且在该种模式下,绿色技术水平、产品绿色度以及商品的价格均达到了集中决策下的情形;(3)在动态批发价机制下,随着绿色投资成本系数的增加或价格敏感度的增加或消费者环保意识的下降,绿色技术水平、产品绿色度、商品价格、零售商的利润以及绿色渠道总利润是下降的,而商品批发价和制造商的利润则是增加的。

Determining an optimal wholesale price is of importance to a firm composed of a single manufacturer and retailer since it significantly affects the decision-making of each profit center and then the firm’s profit. In this paper, the effect of different strategies on the profits of each center and the firm is investigated based on a differential game among members of the green supply chain, i.e., centralized scenario and decentralized scenario. The manufacturer is responsible for providing green products and sells these products to end customers through the retailer who controls the retail price.Our main results show that:(i) there exists a unique saddle stable steady-state equilibrium under the two differential games;(ii) compared with the decentralized scenario, the centralized scenario leads to higher green technology level and higher total profit of green channel;(iii) when the coordination parameter is in a certain range, the dynamic wholesale price mechanism can coordinate the behavior of manufacturer and retailer, and in this mode, the level of green technology, the green degree of products and the price of goods all reach the situation of centralized decision-making;(iv) under the dynamic wholesale price mechanism, with the increase of investment cost coefficient, or the increase of price sensitivity or the decrease of consumer’s environmental awareness, the green technology level, product green degree, price, retailer’s profit and the total profit of green channel is decreased, while the wholesale price and manufacturer’s profit are increased.