参与农产品区域公用品牌提升的三方演化博弈

The Evolutionary Game of Three Parties Participating in the Promotion of Regional Brands of Agricultural Products

农产品区域公用品牌建设在乡村振兴中发挥着重要作用,如何提升农产品区域公用品牌一直是各方关注的焦点。本文运用演化博弈方法,探讨了在提升农产品区域公用品牌过程中,不同场景下各参与主体如何进行策略选择,并用数值仿真对相关结论进行分析。研究结果表明:演化稳定策略受政府补贴力度、奖励、收益和成本的影响;合适的补贴力度有利于三方的共同参与,即农产品生产企业提升产品质量、品牌运营公司积极运营、地方政府严格监管;品牌运营公司给予企业的奖励应在一个合理的范围,同时上级政府增加对地方政府的奖励,也有利于三方共同的参与;降低参与成本和提升参与收益有利于激励农产品生产企业和品牌运营公司参与提升农产品区域公用品牌。

The construction of regional brands of agricultural products plays an important role in rural revitalization. How to improve regional brands of agricultural products has always been the hot issue of attention of all parties. The evolutionary game method is used to discuss how each participant makes strategic choices in different scenarios in the process of promoting regional brands of agricultural products, and numerical simulation is used to analyze relevant conclusions. The research results show that the evolutionary stabilization strategy is affected by government subsidies, rewards, benefits and costs;appropriate subsidies are conducive to the participation of the three parties, that is, agricultural product manufacturers improve product quality, brand operating companies actively operate, and local governments strictly supervise;brand operating companies’ rewards to enterprises should be within a reasonable range, at the same time, higher-level governments increase rewards to local governments, which is also conducive to the participation of the three parties;reducing participation costs and increasing participation benefits are conducive to motivating agricultural product manufacturers and brand operating companies to participate enhance regional brands of agricultural products. This research has certain theoretical and practical guidance for improving the regional brands of agricultural products.