基于声誉理论的直播带货售假行为博弈分析

Game Analysis of Selling Fake Goods by Live Commerce Based on KMRW Theory

“直播带货”自上线以来,受到不少消费者的青睐,很多商家、个人纷纷通过各大网络直播平台带货销售商品,然而“直播带货”乱象层出不穷,售假情况最为严重。本文基于KMRW声誉理论,通过售假带货方与监管方单次博弈和多次博弈的分析得出每个阶段下带货方的最优选择:单次博弈中,不道德的带货方会选择售卖假货获得最大收益;多次博弈中,不道德的带货方会假装为道德型的带货方维持声誉,直到最后阶段放弃维持声誉获得最大收益。

“Live commerce” has been favored by many consumers since its launch. Many businesses and individuals have brought goods to sell through major live commerce platforms. However, the chaos of “live tape” is endless, and selling fake is common. Combining with the KMRW theory, through the analysis of a single game and multiple games between the seller and the regulator, this paper obtains the optimal choice of the seller in each stage: in a single game, the immoral sellers will choose to sell fake goods to obtain the maximum benefit;in multiple games, immoral sellers pretend to maintain their credibility as moral sellers until giving up maintaining their credibility for maximum benefit at last.