考虑生产努力水平的农产品供应链补贴决策

Government Subsidy Decision on Agricultural Supply Chain Considering the Effort Level

构建由零售商和农户组成的两阶段Stackelberg供应链决策博弈模型,得出政府对农户直接补贴和对农业保险保费间接补贴两种模式下的农户最优努力水平、零售商最优基准收购价。分析价格敏感系数、产出率、补贴率、成本系数、农资投入量等参数变化和不同补贴模式对供应链最优决策的影响。研究结果表明:随着政府补贴的增加,农户最优努力水平上升,零售商最优基准收购价下降。补贴金额相同时,间接补贴下的农户最优努力水平、市场零售价更高;直接补贴下的最优基准收购价格、实际收购价格更高。从供应链及各成员利润变化看,若要保障农户增收,应采取直接补贴且补贴比例需控制在合理范围内;若要提升零售商和供应链绩效,则应选择间接补贴。

Based on the direct and indirect agricultural subsidy modes,this paper sets up a two-stage Stackelberg game model composed of retailer and farmer,and solves the optimal effort level decided by farmer and the optimal benchmark purchase price decided by retailer,then analyses the influence of model parameters such as price sensitivity coefficient,output rate,subsidy rate,cost coefficient,agricultural income and different subsidy modes on optimal decision and supply chain are discussed.The results show that the optimal effort level increases,the optimal benchmark purchase price decreases as the government subsidies increase.With the same subsidy expenditure,the optimal effort level and retail price are higher under indirect subsidy,while the optimal benchmark purchase price and actual purchase price are higher under direct subsidy.From the profit changes of supply chain and its members,when the government intends to ensure the income of farmers,direct subsidy should be adopted and the subsidy rate must be controlled within a reasonable range;in contrast,indirect subsidy can be selected to improve the performance of retailers and supply chain.