摘要
构建基于三方博弈的政府-开发商-消费者的激励机制模型,分析模型演化的路径以及稳定策略。研究表明,开发商与消费者的行为策略选择与政府的激励策略呈正比关系,政府行为策略是决定博弈模型演化路径的关键因素。现实条件下,开发商和消费者均不会主动采取激励机制,需要政府通过完善市场机制、增加财政补贴和制定强制措施等策略来提高开发商和消费者的综合收益以推广被动式超低能耗建筑的发展。
A government developer consumer incentive mechanism model is constructed based on three-party game,and the evolution path and stability strategy of the model are analyzed.The research shows that the behavior strategy choice of developers and consumers is in direct proportion to the government's incentive strategy,and the government's behavior strategy is the key factor to determine the evolution path of the game model.In reality,developers and consumers will not take the initiative to adopt incentive mechanism.Therefore,the government needs to improve the comprehensive income of developers and consumers by improving the market mechanism,increasing financial subsidies and formulating compulsory measures to promote the development of passive ultra-low energy consumption buildings.
作者
刘晓义
李海波
LIU Xiao-yi;LI Hai-bo(Hebei Institute of Architecture and Civil Engineering,Zhangjiakou,Hebei 075000)
出处
《河北建筑工程学院学报》
CAS
2022年第2期148-152,共5页
Journal of Hebei Institute of Architecture and Civil Engineering
基金
河北省省级科技计划项目(20557659D)
河北省创新基金项目(CXZZSS2021157)。
关键词
三方博弈
被动式超低能耗建筑
激励机制
tripartite game
passive ultra-low energy consumption building
excitation mechanism