去杠杆政策、内部控制与股利分配——基于双重差分模型的实证检验

Deleveraging policy,internal control and dividend distribution—Empirical test based on the double difference model

本文利用2012—2019年上市公司的面板数据,考察了去杠杆政策对公司股利支付的影响,研究发现:(1)去杠杆政策将会刺激企业提高股利支付;(2)其背后的机制是因为去杠杆政策降低了债务约束,弱化了公司内部控制质量,提高了企业的现金流,激励管理层提高股利支付;(3)但随着管理层持股提高,减弱了去杠杆政策对股利支付的效应。(4)政策效应在竞争更为激烈的产品市场、低成长性企业和民营企业中更加显著。本文基于债务外部约束和自由现金流视角,为去杠杆政策对企业影响提供了微观事实,也为企业制定股利政策提供理论参考。

We used the panel data of listed companies from 2012 to 2019 to examine the impact of deleveraging policies on company dividend payments.The research found:(1)Dynamic downward adjustment of deleveraging policies Time will stimulate companies to increase dividend payments;(2)The policy effect is more pronounced in fierce product market competition,low-growth companies and private companies.(3)The deleveraging policy will increase the dividend payment through the intermediary effect of internal control.(4)The equity incentive of management holding shares reduces the effect of this policy.The theoretical analysis based on the free cash flow hypothesis and substitution model provides micro-facts for exploring the effect of the policy,and also provides a theoretical reference for companies to formulate dividend policies.