从“潜在地是幸福的”到“实现地是幸福的”——论亚里士多德对实践原理的论证

From “to Be Happy Potentially” to “Being Happy Actually”:Remarks on Aristotle’s Argument for the Principles of Practice

按照亚里士多德的理论,因其单纯自然的感觉-运动能力正在成为愿意“听从逻各斯”的感觉-行动能力,且一个伴随着实践理智的思考并与它相一致的欲求正在他的身上生成,一个实践者已“潜在地是幸福的”,但还未“实现地是幸福的”。因为,幸福是灵魂“依照德性的实现”,而他还不是“有德性的”。在“潜在地是幸福的”与“实现地是幸福的”之间似乎存在一条“鸿沟”。亚里士多德为此作出这样的论证:一个实践者若好像知道(即不是不知道)那些细节地,好像因一件事物自身善之故而出于选择地,并好像出于稳定和不变的品性地,像一个有德性的人那样去做合德性的事,就会变得具有德性,变得只要愿意就能运用其实践地获得的德性而思考和行动,成为有德性的人。因为,能力、感受与品性这三种生成于其灵魂的性质状态将由于这样的行动而基于其自然获得新的发展,并生长成为其灵魂的实践性的生命的“新的自然”。而由于这种发展,一个实践者将“实现地是幸福的”。

According to Aristotle, for the sake that his simple natural sense-movement-ability is turning to be a listening-to-logos sense-action-capacity, and that a desire accompanying and agreeing with his practical reason is coming there in him, a practitioner is already “to be happy potentially”yet not “being happy actually”. This is so because happiness is the actualization according to virtue, yet a practitioner is not virtuous. Hence there seems to exist a gap between “to be happy potentially”and“being happy actually”. To fill up the gap Aristotle argues as fellows: if in doing a virtuous act in the way a virtuous man does it a practitioner acts as if he knew(that is, as if he weren’t unknown of) the important details of the matter, as if he chose to do it for the sake of the matter itself, and, as if he did it out of a stable and unchangeable character, he is turning to be kind of virtuous, turning to be able to use his practically acquired virtues to reason and act, and is virtuous simply in this manner. For the three quality-states growing in his soul, capacity, affection, and character, are acquiring their new developments on their natural basis in the process of such practices and growing to become some new nature of the practical life of his soul. And, in terms of this development, the practitioner mentioned is “being happy actually”.