激励与约束影响茶农绿色防控技术采纳行为研究

Research on the Influence of Incentives and Constraints on theTea Farmers’ Adoption Behavior of Green Prevention and Control Technology

基于陕西省、四川省和安徽省965份茶农样本数据,运用二元Logistic回归方法分析市场层面和政府层面推行的激励与约束措施对茶农绿色防控技术采纳行为的影响。结果表明:整体上,激励措施对绿色防控技术采纳行为产生的效果大于约束措施;在激励措施中,市场层面推行的优质优价产生的正向激励效用最大;在约束措施中,政府层面推行的处罚力度的约束效果最优;此外,市场监管正向调节优质优价与政策补贴的作用却削弱了技术培训原有的效果,政府生产监管正向强化地理标志品牌对绿色防控技术采纳的影响。因此,为促进茶农积极使用绿色防控技术须明确激励约束目标、聚焦激励效果从而提高茶农绿色生产的内生动力和持续性。

⑴ Background——In order to solve the problem of increasing pesticide application, the government adopts a series of policies to promote green prevention and control technology, but the adoption rate of tea farmers is still not high, which poses a great threat to forestry ecology and high-quality development.⑵ Methods——From July to August 2020,the research group conducted field research on tea farmers in tea areas under geographical indication protection in Shaanxi, Sichuan and Anhui provinces and 965 samples of tea farmers were obtained.Based on the sample data of tea farmers, the binary Logistic regression method was used to analyze the impact of incentives and constraints implemented at the market level and the government level on the tea farmers’ adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology.⑶ Results——The overall adoption rate of tea farmers’ green prevention and control technology was 43.94%,and their adoption behavior was affected by incentives and constraints at the market level and the government level.At the market level, the positive stimulation of high quality and high price, geographical indication brands and the reverse regulation of market supervision positively affected the tea farmers’ adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology at the level of 1%,5% and 5% respectively;At the government level, the positive stimulation of policy subsidies, technical training, production supervision and constraint regulations positively affected the tea farmers’ adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology at the level of 5%,5%,5% and 1% respectively;The utility generated by the incentive measures implemented at the market level and government level is generally higher than the utility generated by constraints.Among the incentive measures at the market level, the positive incentive utility of high quality and high price is the largest, reaching 8%.Among the constraint measures at the government level, the constraint effect of punishment intensity is the best, reaching 5.2%;Among the interactive effect of incentives and constraints, market supervision strengthens the impact of high quality and high price and policy subsidies on the adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology at 10% and 5% levels, but negatively weakens the role of technical training at 5% level.Government production supervision positively moderates the impact of geographical indication brands on the adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology at 10% level.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——The overall adoption rate of tea farmers’ green prevention and control technology is not high, and their adoption behavior is affected by incentives measures and constraints measures at the market level and the government level, and the effects of different incentive measures and constraints measures are different.Constraints measures have a moderating effect on the impact of incentives measures on tea farmers’ adoption behavior of green prevention and control technology.Different incentives measures and constraints measures have different adjustment directions.Therefore, the policy recommendations are proposed as follows: First, guided by the internal law of market economy, further explore the realization form of “green subsidies”,innovate technology subsidies and provide corresponding technical training at the same time.Second, further improve the market incentive mechanisms, while building market environment constraints.Third, further strengthen the overall planning and coordination between policies, pay more attention to large-scale tea farmers and new agricultural management main bodies, give full play to the role of village collective economic organizations, professional cooperatives and the potential of the “normative management” constraints mechanism.