低碳扩散中政府补贴退坡策略仿真分析

Simulation Analysis of the Decreasing Strategy of Government Subsidy in Low-carbon Diffusion

考虑政府补贴,构建了以企业和消费者为主体的演化博弈模型。根据混合策略得到4种初始情形,基于两种补贴退坡方式,得到4种补贴退坡策略,给出最优补贴退坡策略的判定准则,以新能源汽车为例说明了上述研究内容的应用。研究表明:政府对新能源汽车比亚迪S2补贴的最优退坡策略是对企业和消费者均采取线性退坡;低碳在企业中的扩散具有滞后性;市场的初始状态会影响退坡效果:当初始的企业采取低碳生产的概率和消费者采取低碳消费的概率均较低时,退坡会使低碳补贴失去意义,随着两者概率的增加,退坡效果会逐渐变好,且当概率增大到一定程度时,政府补贴的退坡或者取消不会对低碳的成功扩散产生影响。

This paper built an evolutionary game model of enterprises and consumers considering government subsidy,obtained four different initial cases according to the hybrid strategy,presented two types of government subsidy decreasing methods,obtained four types of the corresponding decreasing strategies,discussed the judgment criteria of the optimal subsidy decreasing strategy,and took new energy vehicles as an example to show the application of above contents.The research shows that:the optimal subsidy decreasing strategy is both linear decrease for enterprises and consumers with BYD S2;the low-carbon diffusion in enterprises has hysteretic nature;the initial state of the market has influence on the decreasing effect of government subsidy:when the probabilities of enterprises with low-carbon production and consumers with low-carbon consumption are smaller,it’s meaningless of the government implementing subsidy decreasing strategy,with these two probabilities becoming bigger,the subsidy decreasing effect becomes better,and when these two probabilities increase to a certain degree,the subsidy decreasing or even phasing out does not have influence on low-carbon diffusion successfully.