财政补贴的供应链决策效率与社会福利研究

Supply Chain Decision-making Efficiency and Social Welfare of Fiscal Subsidies

在再制造供应链中,受限于回收能力以及高昂的投资成本,废旧产品的回收前景并不乐观。文章基于Stackelberg博弈方法,建立了政府分别补贴制造商、零售商和第三方回收商三种不同模型下的闭环供应链决策模型,并从回收率、市场价格以及企业利润等角度分析了在三种不同模型下政府实施补贴对闭环供应链各成员决策的影响。研究发现:只要政府实施补贴,闭环供应链各方的收益均与政府补贴成正比;而从政府层面来看,政府补贴给零售商能达到最高的回收率、最低的市场价格、最大的企业总利润,即补贴零售商时的效率最高;因此以政府补贴零售商为例,对政府不同决策目标下的最优补贴进行了探讨。最后,通过数值模拟分析发现,当政府追求的目标由经济效益扩展到社会福利再到社会效益时,其所支出的最优补贴越来越大。

In the remanufacturing supply chain,limited by the weak recycling capacity and high investment costs,the recycling prospects of used products are not optimistic.Based on the Stackelberg game method,we establish a closed-loop supply chain decision-making model under the three different models of the government granting subsidies to the manufacturer,retailer and third-party recycler,respectively.Then,from the perspectives of recovery rate,market price and corporate profit,we analyze the impact of government subsidies on the decision-making of each member of the closed-loop supply chain under three different models.We find that as long as the government implements the subsidy policy,the benefits of all parties in the closed-loop supply chain are directly proportional to the government subsidies.While from the government level,the government gives subsidies to the retailer will achieve the highest recovery rate,the lowest market price,and the largest total corporate profit,that is,it is most efficient for government to subsidize the retailer.Therefore,taking government subsidized the retailer as an example,we discuss the optimal subsidies under different government decision-making goals.Finally,through numerical analysis,we find that when the government pursues the goal of expanding from econo-mic benefits to social welfare to social benefits,the optimal subsidies it spends are increasing.